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Sullivan: Overruling of Bartolomeo

INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
THE OVERRULING OF BARTOLOMEO
INTRODUCTION

Before the United States Supreme Court gave protection to
defendants during the 1960's, New York courts led the country in
providing individuals protection by liberally interpreting its own
state constitution. 1 However, the recent New York Court of
Appeals decision overruling People v. Bartolomeo2 evidences a
retreat from expansive defendant protection in New York State.
By its decision, the court of appeals has realigned its interpretation of the state constitution with that of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Federal Constitution with respect to the right
to counsel and its application to the investigation of separate
unrelated crimes. 3 In contrast, New York judicial interpretation
1. See Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: JudicialActivism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 764 (1982) [hereinafter Judicial
Activism]; see also Galie, State Constitutional GuaranteesAnd Protection of
Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L. REV.
157, 158 (1979).

2. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981) (holding
that a suspect, represented by counsel on a prior pending charge, may not
waive his rights in the absence of counsel and answer questions on new,
unrelated charges), overruled by, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d
1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
3. Compare Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (once an
individual requests an attorney during custodial interrogation, all questioning
must cease until an attorney is present) and Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675 (1988) (once a suspect requests counsel, police are also prevented from
interrogating the individual with respect to separate unrelated crimes) with
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1963) (once an individual's request for an attorney has been ignored, any
statements obtained by the police would be inadmissible) and People v.
Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (police
may not question an individual once an attorney enters the proceedings unless
the individual waives his right to counsel in front of his attorney) and People
v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (once
an attorney enters the proceeding the individual may not be questioned about
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of the right to counsel in single charge situations continues to
4
offer more protection than its sixth amendment counterpart.
Although both courts interpret the attachment of counsel at
similar stages, 5 the federal court offers less protection because it
finds the right to counsel conditioned upon request 6 during the
post-indictment stage. In New York State, the right to counsel
automatically attaches at later stages in the criminal prosecution
regardless of request. 7 Once the right to counsel has attached, it
cannot be waived outside of the attorney's presence. 8
unrelated matters) and People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d
360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (defendant's specific request for counsel also
invokes his indelible right to counsel).
4. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution expressly
provides for the right to counsel by stating: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The New York State Constitution states: "In any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel as in civil actions... " N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis added).
5. Compare Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)
(extending right to counsel to pre-trial proceedings) and Michigan v. Jackson,
475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (police prohibited from questioning uncounseled
defendant after indictment) with People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166
N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960) (holding indictment is the critical stage
at which the assistance of counsel is indispensable).
6. Compare Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (where the
Court limited its holding to situations in which the accused actually requested
counsel) and Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1988) (sixth
amendment could only be activated if the accused expressly exercises his right
to have counsel present during post-indictment interrogation) with People v.
Rowell, 59 N.Y.2d 727, 730, 450 N.E.2d 232, 233, 463 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427
(1983) (once a critical stage of the criminal proceeding is reached, the indelible
right to counsel attaches regardless of whether the defendant has requested
counsel).
7. See, e.g., People v. Rowell, 59 N.Y.2d 727, 730, 450 N.E.2d 232,
233, 463 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (1983). Once the "critical stage" of a criminal
proceeding is reached, the indelible right to counsel attaches regardless of
whether the defendant has requested counsel, and the police may then no
longer question the defendant unless he waives counsel in his attorney's
presence. Id.
8. Id.; see also People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537,
539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968) (once an attorney enters the proceeding,

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/6

2

Sullivan: Overruling of Bartolomeo

1991]

OVERRULING OFBARTOLOMEO

Moreover, New York also provides greater protection for the
uncharged individual subject to custodial interrogation. In

contrast to federal interpretation of the fifth amendment, once the
accused has requested or retained counsel in New York, there can
be no elicitation of waiver of the right to counsel in the absence
of counsel. 9
Part I of this Comment looks at the Supreme Court's decisions

involving the right to counsel with respect to the fifth and sixth
amendment. A separate analysis of single charge situations and
unrelated separate charge situations is also provided. 10 Part II
police may not question the individual unless he waives his right to counsel in
front of his attorney); People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 210, 400
N.E.2d 360, 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1980) (defendant's specific
request for counsel invokes his indelible right to counsel).
9. Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (waiver of
counsel subsequent to attorney entrance is allowed as long as the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waives'the right) and Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (A request for counsel bars further interrogation
"unless the accused himself initiatesfurther communications, exchanges or
conversations with the police.") (emphasis added) with People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968) (once
an attorney enters the proceeding an individual may not be questioned outside
the attorney's presence unless the individual waives his right in front of his
attorney) and People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 205, 400 N.E.2d 360,
361, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422 (1980) (protection extended to situations where
individual specifically requests counsel).
In addition, the Supreme Court has liberally interpreted waiver. See, e.g.,
Connecticut v. Barret, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987) (where the Court found the
defendant's right to counsel limited by its terms to the making of written
statements and did not prohibit police from obtaining oral statements); Oregon
v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (where the Court found the
defendant's comment of "[w]ell, what's going to happen to me now?,"
constituted an initiation of communication equivalent to waiver).
10. The author uses the term "single charge" to generally refer to the
situation where the defendant's attorney attempts to suppress or objects to the
use of incriminating statements, obtained after the defendant has been arrested
on a particular charge and is questioned about that charge in the absence of an
attorney subsequent to the attachment of the right to counsel. See, e.g.,
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (where defendant was subjected to
continued interrogation in the absence of counsel in spite of his request for
counsel); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243
N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (where it was held that statements obtained by police
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traces the history of the right to counsel in New York by
analyzing the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule 11 and the problems it
created for the courts. 12 Part III discusses the recent overruling

after defendant's attorney called and requested to see him were obtained in
violation of the state constitution).
"Unrelated charge or matter" refers to the situation where the defendant has
been arrested on a particular charge and subsequent to the attachment of the
right to counsel in the context of a single arrest, the police shift focus and
question the defendant about an unrelated matter or charge, thereby eliciting
incriminating statements. See, e.g., Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675
(1988) (where defendant was arrested for burglary, requested an attorney but
made incriminating statements about the burglary after being questioned about
an unrelated matter three days later while he was still in custody); People v.
Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (where
defendant in custody was represented by counsel on robbery but after
continued questioning about an unrelated matter made incriminating statements
about the robbery).
"Separate unrelated charge" refers to the situation where a defendant has
invoked the right to counsel and is released while that matter is pending,
usually after indictment. Subsequently, defendant is arrested and questioned
about a new and different crime. That is, the questioning about the unrelated
crime occurs in the context of a separate arrest. See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton,
474 U.S. 159 (1985) (where defendant was indicted for theft, released and
placed under electronic surveillance for murder which revealed incriminating
statements about the theft); People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423
N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981) (where defendant was represented on a
pending arson charge but was re-arrested and questioned about an unrelated
homicide subsequent to a waiver of his right to counsel on the homicide).
11. People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18
(1979); People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.Y.2d 371, 440
N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981). The holdings of these two cases are collectively referred
to as the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule. See, e.g., People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d
111, 116, 480 N.E.2d 61, 64, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478-79 (1985) (rule
recognized as "so-called indelible right to counsel as enunciated by this court
in People v. Rogers... and People v. Bartolomeo.").
12. See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 350, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022,
559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 485 (1990). The court in describing the Bartolomeo rule
stated: "[T]here is little to be said for a rule which is not firmly grounded on
prior case law, cannot be applied uniformly, favors recidivists over first time
arrestees, and exacts such a heavy cost from the public." Id. See also
Abramovsky, The Right To Counsel: Part I, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 30, 1990, at 3,
col. 4.
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of Bartolomeo by the court of appeals in People v. Bing. 13 It
concludes with a factual comparison of New York 14 and federal
treatment of the right to counsel, 15 which illustrates the use of

divergent paths to similar positions with respect to the right to
counsel and its application to police questioning about unrelated
matters. 16

13. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
14. While the fifth and sixth amendments were made applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8
(1964) and Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963), New York State
courts have not only gone beyond such requirements, but have explicitly based
its decisions on the state constitution. See, e.g., People v Rodriguez, 11
N.Y.2d 279, 284, 183 N.E.2d 651, 652, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1962)
(where the court described the state constitutional ground for the ruling by
citing article I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution); People v.
Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74
(1961) (where the court referred to article I, section 6 of the New York State
Constitution). See also Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection
of Defendants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L.
REv. 157 (1979). The New York State Constitution appears to combine the
fifth and sixth amendments into one article, stating : "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions... nor shall he be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself ..... N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
15. See Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IowA L. REv. 975 (1986). Miranda warnings were
created judicially to protect a suspect's fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 988 n.50. This is distinguishable from
the express sixth amendment right to counsel, which serves to ensure fairness
to the defendant throughout the criminal process. See id. at 980-82.
16. New York courts have abrubtly retreated from providing expansive
protection to defendants in custodial settings with the overturn of Bartolomeo.
Meanwhile, slowly evolving federal interpretation of the fifth amendment has
decreased the liberties of law enforcement officers during custodial
interrogation.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. The Fifth Amendment

1. Single Charges
The fifth and sixth amendments guarantee an accused the right
to counsel. 17 The language of the fifth amendment does not
specifically establish a right to counsel. However, the Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona1 8 established that the defendant
should be entitled to counsel during custodial interrogation to
ensure
adequate
protection
of
his
right
against
19
self-incrimination.
The Court thereby provided clear guidelines for judicial
interpretation of law enforcement activity. If an individual is not
informed of his Miranda rights 20 then statements subsequently
17. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states: "No
person .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ..
." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S.
CONsT. amend. VI.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court created a fifth
amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation in an effort to
protect the right against compelled self-incrimination. 384 U.S. 436, 440-44
(1966). The Court based this rule on the perception that the lawyer occupies a
critical position in our legal system because of his unique ability to protect the
fifth amendment right of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. Id. at
470.
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. Id. at 469-70 (discussing mitigating effects of counsel's presence). The
Court established a set of procedural safeguards to protect the individual
during custodial interrogation by stating: "Prior to any questioning, the person
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
20. The Court in Miranda presumed that interrogation during custodial
situations was inherently coercive. Id. at 445-58 (1966). Consequently, the
Court held that statements made during custodial interrogation are inadmissible
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obtained cannot be used against him as evidence. 2 1 Miranda's
bright line rule was buttressed further in a subsequent fifth
amendment case, Edwards v. Arizona.2 2 In Edwards, the
defendant was read his Miranda rights; then he requested an
attorney. 23 However, the police continued to question him and
finally obtained incriminating statements. 2 4
The Court held that once an individual requests an attorney, all
questioning must cease until an attorney is present. 2 5 This
landmark ruling became known as the Edwards rule 2 6 and
provided additional guidelines for the courts and police. Not only
must the individual be told he can have an attorney present, but
once he requests an attorney the police must cease questioning. 2 7
unless the suspect is informed of his Miranda rights and voluntarily waives his
rights. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (recognizing the
rationale of Miranda warnings but creating a public safety exception).
21. In Miranda, the Court concluded that the individuals' written
confessions did not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to
relinquish constitutional rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492-93 (1966).
22. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
23. Id. at 478-79.
24. After his arrest, Edwards was informed of his Miranda rights and
questioned by police. However, after being told that an accomplice in custody
had implicated him, he requested an attorney, at which point questioning
ceased. However, the next morning police officers asked to question Edwards
again and read him his Miranda rights. After listening to the tape-recorded
statements of his accomplice, Edwards said, "I'll tell you anything you want
to know, but I don't want it on tape." He thereupon implicated himself in the
crime. Id. at 479.
25. Id. at 484-85. "An accused... having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by
the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused
himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police." Id.
26. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 630 (1986); Smith v.
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984);
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983). See also Comment,
Reinforcing Miranda - Restricting InterrogationAfter A Request For Counsel,
48 BROOKLYN L. REV. 593, 605-11 (1983) [hereinafter Reinforcing Miranda].
27. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; see also
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1987) (where the Court stated: "The
rule of the Edwards case came as a corollary to Miranda'sadmonition that '[i]f
the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease
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2. Separate Unrelated Charges
The Court utilized the Edwards rule in subsequent cases2 8 but
limited the scope of its protection. 29 However, in the recent case
of Arizona v. Roberson,30 the Court has not only restored the
protection given in Edwards, but has gone even further by
providing protection in situations involving unrelated crimes.
In Roberson, the defendant was arrested at the scene of a crime
for burglary and after being read his Miranda rights, requested an
attorney. 3 1 As a result, police interrogation was discontinued.
Three days later, while the defendant was still in custody, a
different officer interrogated him about a different crime that had
occurred one day prior to the crime for which the defendant had
been arrested. 32 After waiving his rights to have an attorney
present, the defendant made incriminating statements regarding
the earlier crime. 33 The trial court suppressed the statements in
the defendant's subsequent trial. 34 The issue before the Supreme
until an attorney is present."') (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
474 (1966)).

28. See, e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (Court
extended the Edwards rule to sixth amendment claims); Smith v. Illinois, 469

U.S. 91, 100 (1984) (per curiam) (Court ruled that waiver was invalid under
the Edwards rule).

29. See People v Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 284, 183 N.E.2d 651, 652,
229 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1962) (where the court described the state

constitutional ground for the ruling by citing article I, section 6 of the New
York State Constitution); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984)
(Miranda warnings are not needed in situation where there was paramount
concern for public safety); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)
(Court found respondent "initiated" further conversation in the sense in which

that word was used in Edwards by asking: "Well, what's going to happen to
me now?"); see also Note, Arizona v Roberson: The Supreme Court Expands
Suspects' Rights In The Custodial Interrogation Setting, 22 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 685, 695 n.66 (1989) [hereinafter Supreme Court Expands Suspects'
Rights].
30. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
31. Id. at 678.
32. Id.

33. Id. (statements made in relation to a different burglary crime for which
defendant had not yet been arrested).

34. Id. (statement was supressed in the trial for unrelated offense).
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Court was whether the Edwards rule should extend to prohibit
police interrogation regarding an unrelated matter. 35 The Court
held that the Edwards rule does apply and once a suspect requests
counsel, the police are prevented from interrogating the
individual with respect, not only to the initial crime, but also to
any unrelated investigation. 36 Interestingly, however, had the

suspect not requested counsel on the first robbery and decided
simply to remain silent, the second interrogation and subsequent
37
statement most likely would have been admissible.
35. See id. at 679-80 n.3. (Court granted certiorarito resolve a conflict
with certain state court decisions).
36. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 682-88. However, the Court said the fifth
amendment right to counsel is not absolute in that authorities have the right not
to provide counsel in a reasonable period of time as long as they do not
question the suspect during that time. Id. at 688 n.6 (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
37. The Supreme Court, in Miranda, eluded to the distinction between the
protection afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments. The Court stated,
"when the right to remain silent is invoked, interrogation must cease."
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. If the suspect asked for an attorney, interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present. Id.
It was not until Michigan v. Mosley that the distinction was defined more
thoroughly. 423 U.S. 96, 101 (1975). In Mosley, the defendant refused to
answer questions about a suspected robbery and the police ceased questioning.
Several hours later, however, a different officer questioned him about an
unrelated crime. The defendant then made incriminating statements. Id. at 97.
The Court allowed the statements, holding that when a suspect asserts his right
to remain silent, the police may re-interrogate the suspect later if his request
was "scrupulously honored." Id. at 104. The decision in Mosley did not deal
with the supect's right to counsel, since he did not request an attorney. Id. at
101 n.7. The Court diminished the suspect's rights when there is a request to
remain silent, since police can re-interrogate after the passage of time. Id. at
104. However, the police cannot re-interrogate at all if the suspect requests
counsel. Id. at 103.
The Roberson Court refused to apply Mosley's "scrupulously honored" test
to Roberson's request for counsel because such a request acts as a complete
ban on interrogation. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1988). As
such, they have implicitly decided that a suspect's right to counsel is more
significant than the right to remain silent. See Supreme Court Expands
Suspects' Rights, supra note 29, at 698-99; but see Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 297-98 (1988) (where Court rejected petitioner's argument that
because sixth amendment right to counsel is far superior than the fifth
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The Roberson case seems to extend the judicially created fifth
amendment right to counsel to its extreme. It provides complete
independent protection to a defendant during custodial interrogation. Despite a voluntary waiver with respect to the second
charge, the Court imputes the earlier request for counsel to the
defendant thus insulating him against interrogation. The right to
counsel provided under the constitutionally created sixth
amendment does not provide such prophylactic protection in this
area.

B. The Sixth Amendment
1. Single Charges
The sixth amendment specifically provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to have the

assistance of counsel for his defense." ' 38 The right to counsel
39
historically was limited to trial proceedings only.
Massiah v. United States40 extended the constitutional right
beyond trial proceedings to post-indictment police activity. 4 1
Once the right to counsel has attached, the sixth amendment
prohibits law enforcement officials from using incriminating
statements deliberately elicited from the accused without the
presence of counsel. 42 The Court considered the period from
arraignment to trial to be a critical stage at which defendants are
as much entitled to counsel as at the trial itself. 43 However, some
amendment right to remain silent, it should be more difficult to waive).
38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. See Comment, Patterson v. Illinois: Applying Miranda Waivers to the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 74 IoWA L. REv. 1261, 1270 (1989)

[hereinafter Applying Miranda Waivers].
40. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
41. Id. at 206.
42. Id. at 205-06.
43. See id. at 206. The Court noted that this view of the right to counsel:
no more than reflects a constitutional principle established as long ago
as Powell v. Alabama, where the Court noted that 'during perhaps the
most critical period of the proceedings . . . from the time of their
arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation,
thoroughgoing [sic] investigation and preparation [are] vitally
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confusion remained with respect to whether the sixth amendment
right to counsel is automatically invoked at critical stages or
whether it is contingent upon a request for representation by the
accused. This question was raised in Michigan v. Jackson.44
In Jackson, the Court applied the Edwards rule to the sixth
amendment. The case involved police questioning of indicted
45
defendants who had requested but had not yet received counsel.
The Court held that once an accused activates the right to counsel
at a critical stage, further police interrogation must cease. 46 It
affirmed the attachment of the sixth amendment right to counsel
at critical stages in adversarial proceedings. 47 There was
disagreement, however, about whether the sixth amendment right
to counsel was automatically activated in critical stages 48 or was
contingent upon affirmative invocation. 4 9 Consequently, the
Court limited its holding to situations in which an accused
actually requested counsel. 50
The Court addressed the question of automatic invocation when
it decided Patterson v. Illinois.5 1 In that case, a defendant's
statements were allowed to be used against him even though such
. . . [are] as much entitled to such aid [of
counsel]... as at the trial itself.'
Id. at 205 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
44. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
45. In Jackson, the defendants requested counsel during arraignment.
Between the time of request and the arrival of counsel, police obtained
incriminating statements. Id. at 626-28.
46. Id. at 636.
47. See id. at 630-31; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398
(1977) (critical stages include indictment, filing of an information,
arraignment, and preliminary hearings); Applying Miranda Waivers, supra

important, the defendants

note 39, at 1271.

48. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 638. Justice Steven's majority opinion indicates
automatic activation, stating "[w]e presume that the defendant requests the
lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution." Id.
49. Id. at 640 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (refused to accept a per se rule
barring any police interrogation after indictment absent express invocation).
50. Id. at 636 (Court could limit its holding to situations where there is an

actual request because the specific facts of Jackson included defendants who
had requested counsel).
51. 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
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statements were obtained after indictment and in the absence of
counsel. 52 The notion that the sixth amendment was invoked automatically upon the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings
was rejected. 5 3 The Court determined that the sixth amendment
could be activated only if an accused expressly exercises the right
54
to have counsel present during post-indictment interrogation.
Judicial erosion of the sixth amendment was not limited to the
question of invocation. The Court also addressed the issue of
waiver in deciding whether the use of a pre-indictment Miranda
waiver form could waive sixth amendment rights as well. 55 The
Court concluded that there was no difference between the fifth
56
and sixth amendments with respect to waiver of counsel,
therefore the Miranda warnings served to provide an accused
with enough information to waive the right to counsel knowingly
and intelligently for the purposes of post-indictment
interrogation. 57 How this conclusion was reached in light of
58
Roberson is unclear.

52. Id. at 300.
53. Id. (petitioner contended that his sixth amendment right to counsel
arose with his indictment, therefore police should be barred from questioning
him until an attorney had been obtained).
54. Id. at 290-91. The Court found that even though defendant had a sixth
amendment right to counsel during questioning after indictment, he must
choose to exercise it in order to stop further questioning. Id. The Court
reasoned that such a scenario is not distinguishable from the pre-indictment
interrogatee who, under Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), must assert his fifth
amendment right to counsel in order to bar further interrogation. Patterson,
487 U.S. at 290.
55. See id. at 289-90 (noting that the Court had previously left the issue
open).
56. Id. at 297-98. The Court reasoned that since there is no substantial
difference between the usefulness of the lawyer to the suspect during custodial
interrogation and his value to the accused in post-indictment questioning, the
sixth amendment right to counsel is not superior to the fifth amendment right
with respect to waiver. Id. at 299.
57. Id. at 299-300. The Court stated that "[s]o long as the accused is made
aware of the 'dangers and disadvantages of self-representation' during postindictment questioning, by use of Miranda warnings, his waiver of his sixth
amendment right to counsel at such questioning is 'knowing and intelligent."'
Id.
58. The Roberson court added legitimacy to the distinction between the
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2. Separate Unrelated Charges
If the defendant in Roberson was indicted during his three day
stay, the Court, applying Maine v. Moulton,5 9 would have found
that the right to counsel would not have attached to the unrelated
investigation and the statements regarding the unrelated crime
could be used against him in court.
In Moulton, the issue was whether the police violated the
60
defendant's right to counsel under the sixth amendment. In that
case, the defendant was indicted and while awaiting trial, he
suggested to his co-defendant the possibility of killing a state
witness. 6 1 At a meeting to discuss the upcoming trial, the
co-defendant wore a transmitter to reveal statements about the
possible murder. 62 During the meeting, however, Moulton made
incriminating statements with respect to the theft, not the murder,
63
and these statements were admitted as evidence during his trial.
The Court held that the defendant's right to counsel was violated
64
by the admission of such statements.
Whether the information obtained with respect to the unrelated
charge could be used against him in his trial for the primary
charge was addressed in a footnote, 6 5 where the Court stated
"[i]ncriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to
which the Sixth Amendment right has not attached, are, of

two rights by refusing to allow re-interrogation after some passage of time in a
situation where defendant requests counsel even though this is the approved
technique when the defendant asserts his fifth amendment right to remain
silent. 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988).

In Patterson, the Court refused to find the sixth amendment right superior to
the fifth amendment right and minimized the differences between them. 487
U.S. 285, 297 (1988). As such, the Court found that a fifth amendment waiver
form could be used to waive sixth amendment rights as well. Id.
59. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id. at 163-65 (the meeting took place in a restaurant).
63. Id. at 165-67.
64. Id. at 180.
65. Id. at 180 n.16.
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course, admissible at a trial of those offenses." ' 66 The Court
reasoned that "to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to
which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at
the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other charges
were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the
67
public's interest in the investigation of criminal activities."
It is unclear whether the Supreme Court realizes the dichotomy
it has created between the fifth and sixth amendments. In contrast
to the Moulton rationale mentioned above, the dissent in

Roberson, in a fifth amendment unrelated charge analysis noted
that:
By prohibiting the police from questioning the suspect regarding
a separate investigation, the Court chooses to presume that a
suspect has made the decision that he does not wish to talk about
that investigation without counsel present, although the decision
was made when the suspect was unaware of even the existence of
a separate investigation. 68

Currently, the Court will not allow evidence obtained which is
unrelated to an initial crime, if the defendant requested counsel
for the first crime. 69 The Court will, however, allow evidence
even if an attorney is representing the defendant if the evidence is
unrelated to the initial charge and the defendant does not request

66. Id.
67. Id. at 180. The language in Moulton was later applied in Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432 (1985). In Burbine, the Court allowed the
defendant's statement to be used against him at trial, even though his attorney
had called and was told no questioning would continue. Id. at 415. The Court
found the sixth amendment was not triggered because the events that led to the
inculpatory statements preceded formal initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings. Id. at 432. But see People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397
N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (holding that once an attorney has
entered the proceeding, a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated
in the absence of counsel).
68. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 691-92 (1988) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
69. Id. at 682 (Court unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that the
Edwards rule should not apply when police initiated interrogation of suspect in
custody involves investigation of a separate crime).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/6

14

Sullivan: Overruling of Bartolomeo

1991]

OVERRULING OFBARTOLOMEO

205

an attorney. 70 In both instances the defendant has an attorney.
Yet, under the custodial setting of the fifth amendment, the
defendant's statements regarding the unrelated crime will be
suppressed while under the sixth amendment scenario the
71
statements will be allowed.
It is clear that during the past decade the right to counsel has
strengthened under the fifth amendment and weakened under the
sixth amendment. If an accused requests an attorney during a
fifth amendment custodial interrogation setting, then the Edwards
rule, as expanded by Roberson, protects the accused from any
72
statements made, even if they do not relate to the initial charge.
If the individual is indicted (thus reaching a critical stage), under
Moulton-Burbine,7 3 the statements unrelated to the pending
charge can be used against him. Finally, under Patterson, the defendant now must request an attorney during the post-indictment
stage in order to trigger the sixth amendment right to counsel. 74

70. See Moran v. Burbine, 755 U.S. 412 (1985); Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
71. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682. In Roberson, the petitioner argued that
Mosley should apply in that once Roberson asserted his right to stop
questioning, police should be able to come back after a period of time and requestion. Id. However, the Court distinguished Mosley by pointing out that
Roberson exercised his right to counsel and not merely his right against selfincrimination. Id. at 683. Noting the differences between the fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, the Court held
Roberson's statements were properly excluded. Id. at 695.
72. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text; Supreme Court Expands
Suspects'Rights, supra note 29, at 688-89.
73. In Maine v. Moulton, the Court made clear that evidence pertaining to
other crimes, as to which the sixth amendment right has not yet attached, are
admissible at a trial of those offenses. 474 U.S. 159, 180 and n.16 (1985). In
Moran v. Burbine, the Supreme Court held that neither the defendant's sixth
amendment rights nor due process rights were violated when police elicited
confessions. This was so despite the fact that the police failed to inform the
defendant that his unsolicited retained counsel had called the police station and
was falsely assured that the defendant would not be interrogated. 475 U.S.
412, 417-18 (1986).
74. See supranotes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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II. NEW YORK STATE'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Pre-Rogers-Bartolomeo
The right to counsel in New York is rooted in much older case
law than that of the relatively recent interpretations by the
Supreme Court. 75 The New York right to counsel developed
independently from the federal right and as a result an individual
is provided greater protection under the state constitution 76 than
under the Federal Constitution. The New York courts identified
the attachment of the right to counsel at the commencment of
formal adversarial proceedings in People v. Di Biasi.7 7 The court
75. Four years before the Supreme Court ruled that the fifth amendment is
applicable to state prosecutions, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the
New York Court of Appeals had already ruled that a post-indictment
interrogation in the absence of a defendant's retained counsel violated the
state's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See People v. Di
Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 550-51, 166 N.E.2d 825, 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25
(1960). The Court extended self-incrimination rights to non-capital crimes
whether or not counsel had actually been retained. People v. Waterman, 9
N.Y.2d 561, 565, 175 N.E.2d 445, 447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74 (1961). The
Waterman court suggested that in the absence of indictment, a suspect who
became the focus of investigation was entitled to protection against selfincrimination during interrogation. Id. at 564, 175 N.E.2d at 446, 216
N.Y.S.2d at 73. In other states, where defendants have raised New York cases
in their defense, the courts have expressly declined to follow them. See, e.g.,
People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 144, 366 P.2d 680, 689-90, 18 Cal. Rptr.
40, 49-50 (1961); State v. Kristich, 226 Or. 240, 243, 359 P.2d 1106, 1110
(1961). See also JudicialActivism, supra note 1. The article examines the state
courts' ability to use its own history and "unique characteristics to justify
taking positions independent of and more demanding than federal
constitutional law." Id. at 764.
76. See supra note 75; see also People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 161,
385 N.E.2d 612, 615, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (1978). The New York
State Constitution appears to combine the fifth and sixth amendments into one
article stating: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions...
nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
77. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
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determined that indictment was the critical stage7 8 at which the
right to counsel attaches. 7 9 In subsequent cases, the court
lowered the threshold so that the commencement of a criminal
action occurs at the filing of an accusatory instrument. 80 As such,
once adversarial proceedings are commenced, the right to counsel
attaches and subsequent statements made outside the presence of
counsel will be suppressed. 81
The determinations of adversarial proceedings are periods
similar to those the Supreme Court utilizes in applying the sixth
amendment. 82 The main difference between New York State and
federal interpretation of the right to counsel falls in the area of
waiver. 83
78. Once the "critical stage" of a criminal proceeding is reached, the
indelible right to counsel attaches regardless of whether the defendant has
requested counsel, and the police may then no longer question the defendant
unless he waives counsel in his attorney's presence. People v. Rowell, 59
N.Y.2d 727, 730, 450 N.E.2d 232, 233, 463 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (1983).
79. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at
25.
80. See People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424
N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980) (holding the filing of a felony complaint commenced
formal proceedings); People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962) (holding that statements made after arraignment yet
before indictment should be granted the same protection as post-indictment
statements).
81. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d at 550-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828, 200 N.Y.S.2d at
25. The court further provided that the right to counsel attached after
arraignment. People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 165, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104,
227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962). See The Expanding Right to Counsel in New
York, 10 FoRDHANM URn. L.J. 351, 354 (1982) [hereinafter Expanding Right to
Counsel].
82. See supra note 5.
83. The Supreme Court decisions allow waiver of counsel in the absence
of counsel subsequent to attorney entrance into a proceeding as long as the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right. See Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
After a request for counsel in New York, police are prohibited from further
interrogation or elicitation of waiver of counsel in the absence of counsel. See
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841
(1963) (once an individual's request for an attorney has been ignored, any
statements obtained by police will be inadmissible); People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (police may not
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The New York State courts have developed a novel doctrine to
protect defendants during the custodial stage of criminal proceedings, which is known as the Donovan-Arthur rule. 84 In
People v. Donovan,85 the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
statements obtained by police after the defendant's attorney called
and requested to see him were obtained in violation of the state
constitution. 86 This holding established the Donovan rule which
states that once an individual's request for an attorney has been
ignored or an attorney's request to see his client has been denied,
any statements obtained by police would be inadmissible. 87
After Donovan, the court of appeals decided People v.
Arthur,88 which provided even greater protection for defendants.
The court held that the police may not question an individual
question an individual absent attorney presence once an attorney enters the
proceeding unless the individual waives his right in front of his attorney);
People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979)
(if an individual is represented by counsel, incriminating statements about
unrelated matters obtained in the absence of counsel will be suppressed despite
a voluntary waiver with respect to such matters); People v. Cunningham, 49
N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (indelible right to
counsel is invoked by a specific request for counsel).
84. See People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968) (once an attorney enters a proceeding, police may not
question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless the defendant waives
his right to counsel with his attorney present); People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d
148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963) (statements obtained after an
attorney request to see his client has been denied or a client request to see his
attorney has been denied will be suppressed).
85. 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
86. The court's reasoning relied exclusively on New York law. Judge
Fuld, writing for the majority, stated:
[W]Q find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme Court
of the United States would regard use [of the confessions] a violation of
the defendant's rights under the Federal Constitution ....
[Q]uite apart
from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this State's
constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege against
self incrimination and the right to counsel . . . require the exclusion of
[this] confession ....
Id. at 151, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
87. Id. at 150-51, 193 N.E.2d at 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 842-43.
88. 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968).
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once an attorney enters the proceeding unless the individual
waives his right to counsel in front of his attorney. 89 Years later,
the Donovan-Arthurrule was confirmed in People v. Hobson.90
The court in Hobson extended the "once-an-attorney" rule91 by

focusing more closely on the protection the attorney provides
rather than on the police officer's awareness of the attorney's
entry into the case. 92 The court declared that the presence of

counsel is a more effective safeguard against involuntary waiver
93
of counsel than a mere warning in the absence of counsel.
89. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. This is known as
the "once-an-attorney" rule. See Note, PriorRepresentation and the Duty to
Inquire: Breaching New York's "Once-an-Attorney" Rule, 10 CARDOzo L.
REv. 269 (1988) [hereinafter PriorRepresentation].
Unlike the cases decided by the Supreme Court involving the fifth
amendment, see supra notes 12-44, the court of appeals only allowed the rule
to apply if counsel was present or involved. The question as to what would
occur if the individual requested counsel, as in Edwards, was determined
twelve years later in People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360,
424 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980). If there is no request for counsel and no
representation, the individual can waive his right to counsel in the absence of
an attorney. In this case, any statement can be used during his trial. Id. at 209,
400 N.E.2d at 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (1980).
90. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
Defendant Hobson, while being held in a county jail on unrelated charges, was
placed in a lineup for a robbery. Id. at 482, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 421 (1976). A lawyer who had been appointed for Hobson prior to his
placement in the lineup left after Hobson was positively identified. Id. The
defendant then signed a waiver and agreed to speak to detectives about the
robbery. Id. Although the detective knew Hobson was represented by counsel,
he made no effort to inform the attorney that he intended to interrogate his
client. Id. Hobson said he understood the pre-interrogation warnings which
were read to him, waived his right to counsel, and confessed to the robbery.
Id. at 482-83, 384 N.E.2d at 896-97, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420-21.
91. A waiver is invalid if the defendant is represented by counsel and
counsel is not present during the waiver by the defendant. See People v.
Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666
(1968).
92. See Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
422.
93. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. The court
stressed that the defendant's real protection against an abuse of power by the
authorities is the advice of his lawyer at every critical stage of the proceedings
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Therefore, an individual in police custody in New York may not
waive his right to counsel even if the police are not aware of the
94
attorney's entrance into the proceedings.
In sum, the right to counsel in New York indelibly 95 attaches
and cannot be waived without an attorney's presence when

1) an attorney has already entered the proceeding, 96 2) an
attorney has been requested, 97 or 3) at the commencement of
98
judicial proceedings.
B. The Era of Rogers-Bartolomeo
In New York, the right to counsel was extended from single
charges to inclusion of separate unrelated matters. In the
landmark case of People v. Rogers, 99 the court of appeals held
that if an individual was represented by counsel, and the police
against him. Id. at 485, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
94. The court said: "There is no requirement that the attorney or the
defendant request the police to respect this right of the defendant." Id. at 483,
348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (quoting People v. Arthur, 22
N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968)).
95. See People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 165, 385 N.E.2d 612, 618, 412
N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (1978). The court uses the word "indelibly" to describe
the point at which the right to counsel has attached to the extent that it can
only be waived in the presence of a lawyer. Id.
96. See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at
537, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. See PriorRepresentation, supra note 89, at 268-69
nn.45-50.
97. See, e.g., People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 210, 400 N.E.2d
360, 364-65, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1980) (defendant's specific request for
counsel invoked his indelible right to counsel).
98. The courts view the commencement of judicial proceedings to be
established when there is a filing of an accusatory instrument, such as a felony
complaint. In order for the right to counsel to indelibly attach, there must be
significant judicial activity. See People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371.
N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977) (criminal proceeding was initiated for
right to counsel purposes by issuance of removal order to secure presence of
defendant at lineup on charge unrelated to that for which he was incarcerated);
People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892
(1980) (right to counsel is triggered in New York by the filing of an
accusatory instrument or felony complaint).
99. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).
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question him about unrelated matters in the absence of counsel,
any statements obtained would be suppressed. 10 0 The rule was
expanded in People v. Bartolomeo,10 1 where the court held that
in cases where police have actual knowledge of a pending charge,
there exists an affirmative duty to inquire as to representation by
102
counsel on that charge.
In order to understand the rationale of the court in creating the
unrelated charge expansions framed in Rogers and Bartolomeo, it
is necessary to examine the law as it existed before such decisions. Prior to Rogers, a defendant in custody who was represented by counsel on one charge could still be interrogated in the
10 3
absence of counsel about other unrelated matters.
Consequently, law enforcement personnel utilized continued
interrogation about unrelated matters as a mechanism to obtain
100. Id. The court of appeals modified People v. Taylor, which limited the
scope of an attorney's representation to the specific matters for which the
attorney was retained. 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1971). It extended the Donovan-Arthur doctrine that once an attorney enters
the proceeding, all interrogation including those related to waiver of counsel
must cease until an attorney is present. See supra note 89. The doctrine now
encompasses those defendants who were represented either on the current
charge or on a prior, unrelated charge. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d
at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22. See also Abramovsky, The Right to Counsel: Part
I, N.Y.LU., Aug. 30, 1990 at 7, col. 3. Subsequently, the New York Court of
Appeals has recognized a specific request for counsel as an invocation of the
indelible right to counsel as well. People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203,
210, 400 N.E.2d 360, 364, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 425 (1980).
The Supreme Court adopted a similar position eleven years later. See
Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988) (where defendant's request for
counsel barred police unrelated crime interrogation of defendant who remained
in custody).
101. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981),
overruled by, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
102. Id. at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
103. See, e.g., Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1971). In Taylor, the defendant was represented on a robbery charge but made
incriminating statements about a murder in the absence of counsel. The court
held the statements were admissible because the attorney's involvement related
to the separate charge of robbery. Id. at 332, 266 N.E.2d at 633, 318
N.Y.S.2d at 5.
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confessions with respect to the present charge for which an
attorney had been retained. 104 Accordingly, the Rogers court
framed its decision to prevent state infringement of the
individual's right to counsel based on the state constitution.1 °5
The court balanced the fundamental privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel against the significant
interest of the state in investigating and prosecuting criminal
conduct. 106
By holding that not only were police to cease questioning once
counsel has appeared, but the police were now forbidden to elicit
any statements from the defendant including waiver of the right
to counsel in the absence of counsel, 10 7 the court repudiated the
rule that allowed interrogation of a defendant about unrelated
8
matters. 10
In Rogers, the defendant was arrested as a suspect in a liquor
store robbery. Although represented by an attorney, the
defendant waived his Miranda rights without his attorney's
knowledge or presence and denied involvement in the crime. 10 9
After continued interrogation, his attorney called and demanded
that all interrogation cease. 110 At this point, the police merely
shifted focus and for the next four hours questioned the defendant
about an unrelated event. 111 This failed to produce any further
information. However, as the interrogating detective was filling
104. See Expanding Right to Counsel, supra note 81, at 359-60.
105. See Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d
at 19. It was stated that "[tihis court has jealously guarded the individual's
privilege against self incrimination and right to counsel, demanding that these
fundamental rights be accorded the highest degree of respect by those
representing the State .... " Id. "Although the State has a significant interest
in investigating and prosecuting criminal conduct, that interest cannot override
the fundamental right to an attorney guaranteed by our State Constitution." Id.
at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
106. Id.
107. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.

108. See People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1971); see also supra notes 103 and 104.
109. Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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out some paperwork, he overheard the defendant make an
incriminating statement. 112 Such evidence was admitted at the
trial and the defendant was convicted of the robbery in
question.

113

The court, in concluding such statements inadmissible,
reasoned "we may not blithely override the importance of the
attorney-client relationship by permitting interrogation of an
accused with respect to matters which some may perceive to be
unrelated.", 114 The Rogers decision was viewed as a bar to police
interrogation regarding present or pending charges absent
attorney presence once an attorney has entered the
proceedings. 115 Nonetheless, a question remained concerning
those situations in which the police claimed they were unaware
that a defendant was represented by an attorney.
In People v. Bartolomeo,116 the court held that once the police
know a person in custody has a pending criminal charge, they
must first "inquire whether [the] defendant was represented by an
attorney on that charge" 117 before proceeding to interrogate him
112. Id.
113. Id. at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.

114. Id.
115. However, in Rogers, the court did acknowledge the state's interest in
investigations and stated that its "holding creates no undue impediment to the
investigation of criminal conduct unrelated to the pending charge. An accused
individual represented by counsel may still be questioned about such matters,
we hold simply that information obtained through that questioning in the
absence of counsel may not be used against him." Id. at 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d
at 713 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22 n.2. In reality, the Rogers decision continues
to bar the use of post-request statements related to the original charge for
which the defendant was arrested and post-request statements about the
unrelated conduct. But see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (where the
Court used the same reasoning to bar the use of statements made in relation to
the original charge for which the defendant had been indicted and allowed
statements made in relation to the new, unrelated charge for which the
defendant had waived his right to counsel). See supra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text; infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
116. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981),
overruled by, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
117. Id. at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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about a different crime. 118 In this case, the defendant waived his
Miranda rights 119 and never informed the police that he was
represented by counsel on an unrelated charge. 120 He
subsequently made several incriminating statements about the
second charge. 12 1 Here, the interrogating detectives had actual
22
knowledge of the pending charge. 1
The court found that there existed an obligation to inquire
whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that
charge. 12 3 Having failed to make such an inquiry, the officers
were chargeable with the knowledgd that such an inquiry would
have disclosed. 124 Therefore, knowledge of defendant's prior
legal representation was imputed to the police. Thus,
interrogation or waiver of counsel was foreclosed absent the
attorney's presence. 125
C. Subsequent Problems with Rogers-Bartolomeo
This derivative right to counsel soon became known as the
Rogers-Bartolomeo rule. 126 However, rather than strengthen the

doctrine, the courts were faced with the problem of how and
when to impute knowledge to the police that there was in fact a
118. Id.
119. The protection the defendant enjoys under the Federal Constitution, as
interpreted in the Miranda decision, is that his confession will be excluded
unless it can be shown that the authorities secured the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination of the accused through procedural
safeguards. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 (1966).
120. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 230, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374, 440
N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (1981). The defendant was represented by counsel for an
arson charge when he was questioned by detectives concerning an unrelated
murder investigation. Although homicide detectives knew of the pending
charge, they did not know and did not ask if the defendant had retained
counsel. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
123. Id. at 231-32, 423 N.E.2d at 375, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Abramovsky, The Right to Counsel: Part 1I, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30,
1990, at 3, col.1.
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charge pending against the defendant to which the right to
counsel had attached. 12 7 The debate centered on three areas: 12 8
the situs of the prior charge, 12 9 the duty of inquiry following the
127. Charging the police with a "duty to inquire" as to whether the
defendant had a pending charge created a good deal of confusion within the
court system, and lower courts have denied suppression where interrogation
should not have been permitted. See, e.g., People v. Steele, 135 A.D.2d 673,
522 N.Y.S.2d 248 (2d Dep't 1987) (conviction affirmed when defendant failed
to prove representation existed at the time of interrogation), appeal denied, 70
N.Y.2d 1011, 521 N.E.2d 1089, 526 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1988); People v.
Brennan, 129 A.D.2d 892, 514 N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't 1987) (conviction
affirmed although police knew of pending charges but failed to inquire about
representation); People v. Ryans, 118 A.D.2d 741, 500 N.Y.S.2d 74 (2d
Dep't 1986) (knowledge of pending charge does not preclude questioning on
new charge).
To respond to this confusion, the New York courts delineated four factors to
take into consideration when faced with whether to impute the knowledge of
pending charge to the police. Those factors were: 1) whether the previous
charge was recent or remote in time; 2) whether the prior offense was a minor
offense or a serious crime; 3) whether the prior charge was pending in the
same jurisdiction; and 4) whether the police were acting in good faith. See
PriorRepresentationn,supranote 89, at 273 nn.73-76.
In People v. Lucarano, the court addressed the problem of the extent of
police inquiry required under Bartolomeo. 61 N.Y.2d 138, 141-42, 460
N.E.2d 1328, 1329, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894, 895 (1984). The court concluded that
the police need only ask whether the defendant has an attorney on an unrelated
pending charge. Id. at 148, 460 N.E.2d at 1333, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
128. See Abramovsky, The Right to Counsel: Part II, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30,
1990, at 3, col.1.
129. In Bartolomeo, the prior arrest occurred within the same precinct. 53
N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981) (on May 27, 1978,
defendant was arraigned for arson and on June 5, 1978, defendant was
apprehended by the same law enforcement agency for an unrelated homicide).
See People v. Torres, 137 Misc. 2d 29, 59 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1987), rev'd, 165
A.D.2d 771, 560 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1990) (constructive knowledge
imposed); People v. Mehan, 112 A.D.2d 482, 490 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't),
appeal denied, 66 N.Y.2d 1041, 489 N.E.2d 1311, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1039
(1985) (where constructive knowledge imposed for New Jersey charge);
People v. Patterson, 85 A.D.2d 698, 445 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1981)
(where Nassau County police officers were charged with constructive
knowledge of Brooklyn arrest). But see People v. Bing, 146 A.D.2l 178, 540
N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1989) (where court agreed a geographical limit to the
derivative right to counsel should be recognized where defendant arrested in
New York had a pending Ohio warrant for burglary), aff'd, 76 N.Y.2d 331,
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defendant's assertion that he was without counsel, 130 and the
necessary quality of ties between the defendant and his
counsel. 131

In People v. Torres, 132 the first department addressed the
problem of extra-territorial application of the derivative right to
counsel. In that case, the question was whether police knowledge
should be imputed even if the prior arrest occurred in New
Jersey. 133 The court concluded that the defendant represented on
the unrelated pending charge in New Jersey is entitled to the
same protection as a similarly situated individual with a local

pending charge. 134 The third department had previously taken the
same position. 135 However, the second department, sensitive to
558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
130. See People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't
1989) (where court affirmed trial court denial of motion to suppress based on
finding that although police knew of unrelated charge, they reasonably
believed it had been dismissed), aff'd sub nom, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d
331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990); People v. Bertolo, 65
N.Y.2d 111, 480 N.E.2d 61, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1985) (where court held
constructive knowledge would be imputed only if the police had actual
knowledge of recent arrest on a serious charge); People v. Lucarano, 61
N.Y.2d 138, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1984) (where court held
Bartolomeo did not apply when defendant denied representation on prior
arrests because they stemmed from family court matters and law enforcement
belief was reasonable).
131. See People v. Cawley, 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st
Dep't 1989) (where court affirmed an order of the trial court suppressing
inculpatory statements even though the defendant on prior charge for which he
had counsel jumped bail and remained a fugitive for six months), rev'd sub
nom, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1990).
132. 137 Misc. 2d 29, 59 N.Y.S.2d 613 (1987), rev'd, 165 A.D.2d 771,
560 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1st Dep't 1990).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 33, 59 N.Y.S.2d at 617. In Torres, the defendant was
represented in New Jersey on an unrelated charge and the court concluded that
"it would be inappropriate to hold that, merely because his other case was in a
foreign jurisdiction, the defendant should be entitled to any less protection."
Id.
135. See People v. Mehan, 112 A.D.2d 482, 490 N.Y.S.2d 897 (3d Dep't),
appeal denied, 66 N.Y.2d 1041, 489 N.E.2d 1311, 499 N.Y.S.2d 1039
(1985). This case, decided in the appellate division, third department, involved
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extra-territorial application as an encumbrance to effective law
enforcement, rejected this position. 136
The second area of confusion regarding the Rogers-Bartolomeo
rule concerned the situation where defendant denies prior
representation. 137 For example, in People v. Lucarano,138 the
defendant was arrested in connection with an assault. 13 9 The

detectives knew he had prior arrests. 140 However, the defendant
denied he had attorney representation because the prior arrests
were family court matters. 14 1 Defendant then waived his right to
counsel and eventually confessed. 142
The court of appeals found that Rogers-Bartolomeo did not
apply because law enforcement belief in the defendant's denial
was reasonable. 14 3 Subsequently, the court held that constructive
knowledge would only apply if police had actual knowledge of a
a defendant in New Jersey with an unrelated charge. See Mehan, 112 A.D.2d
at 484, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 899. The court came to the same conclusion as the
appellate division, first department and applied the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule to
suppress the statement. Id.
136. In Bing, Justice Brown wrote the opinion for the second department
and stated that the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule provides only derivative and
indirect sixth amendment protection. Bing, 146 A.D.2d at 183-184, 540
N.Y.S.2d at 250-251. The court adopted the reasoning of People v. Robles, 72
N.Y.2d 689, 533 N.E.2d 240, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1988), when stating that
"Rogers established a derivative, and accordingly limited right with respect to
unrelated charges in order to protect the direct and full fledged right to counsel
in the pending proceeding." Id. at 183, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 250. The court
established that "any interest that this State may have in protecting a
defendant's right to counsel vis-a-vis a charge pending in a foreign jurisdiction
is outweighed by its legitimate interest in the enforcement of its criminal
statutes and, thus, an extension of the Rogers-Bartolomeo rule is not
justified." Id. at 184, 540 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
137. See supra note 130.
138. 61 N.Y.2d 138, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 472 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1984).
139. Id.
140. Id. (a check through Suffolk County records revealed that defendant
had several prior arrests, the last of which occurred only about two weeks
previously).
141. Id. at 143, 460 N.E.2d at 1330, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 896 (defendant was
in fact represented by court appointed counsel on several outstanding charges).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 148, 460 N.E.2d at 1333, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
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recent arrest on a serious charge. 144
Finally, prosecutors challenged the application of Bartolomeo
to situations of tentative prior attorney-client relations. 145 Such a
situation became the third prong of attack which led to the
eventual overturn of Bartolomeo.146
ll. THE OVERRULING OF BARTOLOMEO
A. People v. Bing
In the spring of 1990 the court of appeals reviewed People v.
Bing. 147 It was faced with the decision of whether to extend the
Rogers-Bartolomeo rule to foreign jurisdictions or limit the application of the rule solely based on the situs of the attorney-client
relationship. 148 During such time, the court took the opportunity
to address two other cases. 149 Rather than go along with
precedent or follow its prior decisions, the court refused to
extend or create more exceptions to the prior rule and simply
overruled Bartolomeo.150
After nine years of unsolicited protection, the court broke with
the doctrine of stare decisis. 15 1 It reasoned that to apply the rule

144. People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111, 480 N.E.2d 61, 490 N.Y.S.2d 475
(1985).
145. See supra note 131.
146. See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474 (1990).
147. 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
148. Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (1990).
149. People v. Cawley, 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't
1989); People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1st Dep't
1989).
150. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
151. The court discussed the doctrine of stare decisis and stated: "Although
a court should be slow to overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid
doing so when persuaded by the 'lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning."' Id. at 338, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (citing
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407-408 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol8/iss1/6

28

Sullivan: Overruling of Bartolomeo

1991]

OVERRULING OF BARTOLOMEO

219

to each case before it 15 2 would have resulted in the placement of
"unacceptable burdens on law enforcement. ' , 153 The court also
noted that to create another exception would undermine the rule's
rationale. 154 It stated that the policy and basis behind the
Bartolomeo rule was weak 155 and noted that it was not until
People v. Robles, 156 that a rationale for the rule was estab-

lished. 157

The court in Bing came to the realization that the right to counsel under Bartolomeo was an aberrant extension 15 8 of Rogers. 159
152. People v. Bing, 146 A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1989)
(where defendant had been represented in Ohio for burglary, and was
subsequently arrested in New York for robbery and the court was asked to
recognize a geographical exception to Bartolomeo); People v. Cawley, 150
A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1989) (where defendant was
briefly represented on a prior charge but jumped bail remaining a fugitive for
six months and the court was asked to recognize an exception based on the
quality of attorney-client relationship); People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344,
541 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1st Dep't 1989) (where defendant informed police he had
been "let go" on other crimes and lower court found that police belief in his
statement was reasonable and motion to suppress was denied).
153. People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 477.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 348-349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484. The court

stated:
The right to assistance of counsel is one of the most important means of
protection against police harassment afforded individuals. But the right
recognized must rest on some principled basis which justifies its social
cost. Bartolomeo has no such basis. It rests on a fictional attorney-client
relationship derived from a prior charge and premised on the belief that
a lawyer would not refuse to aid his newly charged client.
Id.
156. 72 N.Y.2d 689, 533 N.E.2d 240, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1988).
157. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 343-44, 588 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at
481. Robles, decided seven years after Bartolomeo, explained that the right to
counsel on the new charge was derived from representation on the prior
pending charge and when the prior charge has been disposed of by dismissal or
conviction, the indelible right to counsel disappears. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689,
698, 533 N.E.2d 240, 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1988).
158. The dissent stated: "The court's opinion portrays Bartolomeo as an
aberrant decision not worthy of precedential respect, a decision without a
principled basis or even a rationale until it was invested with one seven years
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Rogers was designed to protect against police use of unrelated in160 It
terrogation as a tool for unfairly obtaining confessions.
applied only to situations where the defendant was taken into
custody and clearly asserted his right to counsel. 161 Accordingly,
the court, in justifying its reason for overruling Bartolomeo,
weighed many factors in coming to its decision. 162
The court noted that the "failure to elaborate the basis for the
[Bartolomeo] rule. . . cause[d] considerable difficulty in subsequent cases. .. ,,
163 Decisions after Bartolomeo limited the rule

by creating exceptions. 164 It was a judicial "effortl.

.

.[at] bal-

anc[ing] the benefits of evenhanded administration of the criminal
law with the cost the rule exacted from effective law enforcement." ' 16 5 However, the court noted that recognition of the

later." Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486
(Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to
Cawley) (emphasis added).
159. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
The court, in closing, emphasized that:
although Rogers and Bartolomeo are frequently linked in legal literature
...the two holdings are quite different. In People v. Rogers, the right
to counsel had been invoked on the charges on which the defendant was
taken into custody and he and his counsel clearly asserted it . . .In

People v. Bartolomeo, however, defendant was taken into custody for
questioning on a new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that
charge and freely waived his right to counsel ....
Id. (citations omitted).
160. "As in Rogers, the court confronted what was perceived as a means of
circumventing defendant's constitutional rights through questioning on
'unrelated' matters." Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 354, 558 N.E.2d at 1025, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and
dissenting as to Cawley).
161. See supra note 159.
162. Id. at 349-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (the fact that
so many exceptions were developed because of the rule; the overruling of the
rule would not violate the state constitution or ethical principles; the rule
protected recidivists over first time offenders; and the fact that the rule exacted
heavy costs to society).
163. Id. at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
164. Id. at 343, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
165. Id. at 342-43, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
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exceptions to the rule urged in the cases at hand 166 would

effectively undermine "the jurisprudential basis on which it
rests. "167

Additionally, the court reasoned that permitting questioning
about unrelated crimes would not violate the state constitution or
ethical principles. 168 The state constitution relates the right to
counsel in criminal proceedings to the application of the right to
counsel in civil actions.169 Consequently, the court found no
ethical reason against application of the civil setting, where an
attorney is not foreclosed from speaking to an adverse party
about an unrelated matter for which there is no representation, to
state criminal procedure. 170
Finally, the court noted that the rule favored recidivists over
first-time offenders because a first-time arrestee, with no criminal
experience may waive his rights and be questioned without the
presence of counsel. 17 1 Conversely, the "second-time offender,
who presumably has received prior advice on how to deal with
the authorities and has voluntarily chosen a different course of
action on the new charge, [is] foreclosed from waiving rights on
172
the matter for which he was detained."
B. Post-Bing Protectionv. CurrentFederal Guarantees
In order to effectively compare federal protection of the right to
counsel with New York protection, it is necessary to examine
several hypothetical situations, all of which presuppose the proper
166. "The People . . .would have us add new exceptions in Bing, for
pending charges in other States, and in Cawley, for defendants who implicitly

relinquish the attorney-client relationship by absconding." Id. at 344, 558
N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
167. Id. at 346, 558 N.E.2d at 1020, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 483.

168. Id. at 349-350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
169. The New York State Constitution states: "In any trial in any court
whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
with counsel as in civil actions ....
' N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (emphasis
added).
170. Bing at 349-50, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
171. Id. at 342, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
172. Id.
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73

administration of Miranda warnings.1
The first hypothetical scenario involves a defendant who is
arrested on charge "A" and requests counsel. Police virtually ignore the request and continue questioning the defendant without
representation. The defendant finally confesses. 174
Under federal interpretation of the fifth amendment right to
counsel, such a confession would be suppressed 175 unless it is
found that the accused initiated further communication with the
police. 176 Absent such conduct, however, once an individual
requests counsel, all questioning must cease until an attorney is
present. 177
In New York, the request or presence of counsel is an absolute
bar to further interrogation or solicitation of waiver in the
absence of counsel. 17 8 Therefore, despite a seemingly voluntary
173. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court established a set
of procedural safeguards to protect individuals during custodial interrogation
by stating: "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
174. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); see also People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963); People
v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968);
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421
(1980); supra notes 20-22, 82-86.
175. See supra note 25.
176. See supra notes 24-26.
177. See Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). But see Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (waiver of counsel subsequent to attorney entrance is
permitted in the absence of counsel as long as the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waives the right).
178. See People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968). In Arthur, the court held that a waiver is invalid if
the defendant is represented by counsel and counsel is not present. Id. Unlike
the Supreme Court, however, the court of appeals only allowed the rule to
apply if counsel was present or involved. Id. The question as to what would
occur if the individual requested counsel was decided twelve years later in
People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421
(1980). In Cunningham, the court found defendant's specific request for
counsel invoked his indelible right to counsel. Id.at 205, 400 N.E.2d at 361,
424 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
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waiver in the absence of counsel, such statements would be sup79

pressed.1
The second situation involves a defendant who is arrested on
charge "A" and requests counsel. Police shift focus and question

defendant about an unrelated crime "B" in the absence of counsel
while the defendant is still in custody. Defendant waives the right
to counsel on "B" and makes incriminating statements with
respect to "B". 180
Under federal interpretation of the fifth amendment right to
counsel, such statements would be suppressed. 181 Once a suspect
requests counsel, the police are prevented from interrogating the
individual with respect not only to the initial charge but also to
182
any unrelated investigation.
The New York State judiciary has indirectly provided the same
protection. 183 Although originally limited to situations where the
179. See, e.g., Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292
N.Y.S.2d at 666 (1968) (individual must waive his right to counsel in front of
his attorney).
180. See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); People v. Rogers, 48
N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979); see supra notes 2834, 106-12 and accompanying text.
181. See supranotes 31-35 (discussing facts of Roberson).
182. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682-88.
183. The rule evolved to its present state through several cases. See People
v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 150-51, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d
841, 842 (1963) (once an individual's request for an attorney has been
ignored, any statements obtained by police will be ignored); People v. Arthur,
22 N.Y.2d 325, 329, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1968)
(police may not question an individual in the absence of counsel once an
attorney enters the proceeding unless the individual waives his right to counsel
in front of his attorney); People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 331-32, 266
N.E.2d 630, 632-33, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1971) (interrogation about unrelated
matters is allowed because right to counsel did not attach to those matters);
People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d
18, 22 (1979) (modified Taylor rule and bars all questioning in the absence of
counsel including those "unrelated" to the initial arrest); People v.
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 231-32, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374-75, 440 N.Y.S.2d
894, 897 (1981) (interprets Rogers as extending right to counsel invoked on
previous pending charge to unrelated arrest); People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331,
338, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477 (1990) (overruled
Bartolomeo but kept Rogers rule intact).
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attorney had actually entered the proceedings, 184 New York now
recognizes a specific request for counsel as an invocation of the
indelible right to counsel.185 Therefore, once an attorney has
entered or been requested, any statements elicited will be suppressed. 186 Such a bar extends to interrogation about unrelated
matters because it is the responsibility of the retained or requested
counsel to determine what constitutes an "unrelated" matter. 187
In the above situation, under both federal and state
interpretation, all statements obtained in custodial interrogation
subsequent to a request for counsel will be suppressed. 18 8
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the incriminating statement relates to charge "A" or charge "B" if the request or retention of
189
counsel has been ignored in a custodial setting.
The third situation involves a defendant who is arrested on
charge "A", retains counsel and is indicted. Defendant is later
arrested on charge "B", waives his right to counsel and makes
incriminating statements with respect to "B". 19 0
184. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (defendant's specific request for counsel invokes his
indelible right to counsel).
185. See Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d at 210, 400 N.E.2d at 364-65, 424
N.Y.S.2d at 425.
186. See supra notes 96-97.
187. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
188. Compare Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988) (where
suppression of statements made with respect to the unrelated crime at trial for
that crime was upheld); and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981)
(where statements made with respect to crime for which defendant was
arrested, made after continuous interrogation subsequent to request for counsel
were suppressed at trial for that crime) with Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397
N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979). A defendant was arrested on an initial
charge and questioned. Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
When the defendant invoked the right to counsel, the police merely shifted
focus and questioned the defendant about unrelated matters. Id. Defendant's
incriminating statements relating to the initial crime were erroneously admitted
in a trial for that offense. Id. at 169, 397 N'E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
In addition, the Court banned the use of statements made with respect to the
unrelated crime in a trial for that crime as well. Id. at 173 n.2., 397 N.E.2d at
713 n.2., 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22 n.2.
189. Id.
190. See supra note 60-67 and accompanying text.
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Under federal interpretation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, such statements would be admissible at a trial for the
"B" charge. 19 1 Evidence pertaining to other crimes to which the
sixth amendment right to counsel has not yet attached, are
admissible at a trial for those offenses. 192 Since the defendant
voluntarily waived counsel with respect to "B" and was not yet
indicted for that crime, the right to counsel did not attach and the
statements would be allowed. This is distinguishable from a fifth
amendment right to counsel interpretation which would be
applicable if the questioning relating to "B" occurred in the
context of a single arrest prior to indictment. 193
In New York, prior to the decision overruling Bartolomeo,
such statements would likely have been suppressed. 194 In such a
scenario, the police involved in the "B" arrest had an affirmative
duty to find out whether defendant was represented by counsel on
the prior pending charge. 195 If they failed to do this, they were
held accountable for the fact that the defendant had prior pending
representation. 19 6 Such prior representation would be imputed to
the second arrest, despite the voluntary waiver of counsel. 197
This was true even if questioning about "B" occurred in the
context of a separate arrest. 19 8
In the aftermath of Bartolomeo, it was possible to urge judicial
recognition of an exception to the rule depending upon the
specific facts of the case and the judicial department. 199 Indeed,
191. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
192. Id. at 180 n.16.
193. See supranotes 28-37, 180-89 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.

195. People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 231-32, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374,
440 N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (1981).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138, 460 N.E.2d 1328, 472

N.Y.S.2d 894 (1984) (suspect denial of representation releases police from
obligation of further inquiry if such denial is reasonable); People v.
Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 420 N.E.2d 45, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1981)
(despite police failure of inquiry, the right to counsel does not attach on a
separate unrelated charge if there was in fact no representation on the prior
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Judge Kaye's separate opinion in the Bing decision specifically
advocated the creation of exceptions in order to preserve the doctrine of stare decisis.20 0 Now that Bartolomeo is overruled, the
statements made in the third scenario will be admissible. The
Bing court distinguished between questioning with respect to unrelated matters in the context of a single arrest and questioning
pending charge); see also People v. Mullins, 103 A.D.2d 994, 479 N.Y.S.2d
820 (3d Dep't 1984) (spontaneous and voluntary inculpatory statements
acknowledged as exception to right to counsel rules); supra notes 128-46 and
accompanying text.
200. People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 351-61, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1023-29,
559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 486-92 (1990) (Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing
and Medina, and dissenting as to Cawley). It was noted that Bartolomeo was
an integral part of right-to-counsel cases which weighed the interests of both
defendants and law enforcment. Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 486. Therefore, there is a rationale for the rule. Id. at 355, 558
N.E.2d at 1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 489. Judge Kaye also found that the three
appeals could be sensibly resolved without undercutting the rationale of the
rule. Id. at 355-56, 558 N.E.2d at 1026, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
In Bing, the People urged recognition of a territorial limitation to the
Bartolomeo rule. Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
Noting the difficulties of inter-state application of the rule and the decreased
incentive for interrogation by New York authorities on an out-of-state matter,
Judge Kaye found the facts of Bing to be outside the Bartolomeo rule and
therefore statements elicited in such a situation were admissible. Id. at 358,
558 N.E.2d at 1027, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
Additionally, Judge Kaye found the facts of Medina to be outside the scope
of application of the Bartolomeo rule. Id. The defendant had told police that he
had been "let go" on the prior pending charge. Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at
1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476. Judge Kaye considered this to be a straight
application of People v. Bertolo, 65 N.Y.2d 111, 480 N.E.2d 61, 490
N.Y.S.2d 475 (1985), which allows the use of incriminating statements about
unrelated charges as long as the police reasonably believed those charges are
no longer pending, and they do not act in bad faith. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 358,
558 N.E.2d at 1027, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
Finally, with respect to Cawley, the People asked the court to consider
whether an outstanding bench warrant should be treated as a pending unrelated
charge. Id. at 359, 558 N.E.2d at 1028, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 491. This question,
Judge Kaye stated, was avoided by overruling Bartolomeo. Id. However, if it
were answered in the affirmative, any inquiry into the substantiality of the
defendant's relationship with his lawyer would be inappropriate and the
statements would be suppressed. Id.
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about unrelated matters in the context of a separate arrest. 2 01
Since the defendant in the above scenario was specifically taken
into custody for the new unrelated charge and he freely waived
his right to counsel with respect to that charge, such statements
2
would be admissible. 20
It seems the New York Court of Appeals has used a longer
road to come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in
situations of unrelated, prior pending charge situations. In People
v. Rogers, the court reasoned that no impediment to the
investigation of criminal conduct unrelated to the pending charge
was created because the bar extends only to the use of those
2 03
incriminating statements and not the actual questioning.
Therefore, if the defendant is questioned subsequent to invocation
of the right to counsel about unrelated matters during custody on
the initial charge, all subsequent statements will be suppressed
(both "A" and "B"). 204
In People v. Bartolomeo, the court extended the bar to situations involving incriminating statements about prior, pending
charges obtained in the context of a separate arrest where the
right to counsel had previously attached. 20 5 Although this fact
pattern is similar to Maine v. Moulton,20 6 the New York result
under Bartolomeo required suppression of statements relating to
the initial charge and the new, unrelated charge. 2 07 In contrast,
the federal result allows statements about the new, unrelated
charge to be used. 20 8
201. See supra note 159.
202. Id.
203. 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d 709, 713 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d
18, 22 n.2 (1979).
204. Id.
205. 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981).
206. 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (where the defendant was indicted for theft and
was subject to electronic surveillance to reveal statements about a possible
murder but the revealed statements concerned the theft).
207. See supra note 115.
208. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985). The court stated
"incriminating statements pertaining to other crimes, as to which the Sixth
Amendment right has not attached, are, of course, admissible at a trial of those
offenses." Id.
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This distinction seems borne out of the issue of waiver. Since
the Supreme Court allows waiver in the absence of counsel as
long as it is knowing and intelligent, 209 a waiver on the unrelated
charge can be independently assessed. Conversely, since New
York has adopted a per se rule banning waiver in the absence of
counsel once the right to counsel has attached, 2 10 the court was
compelled to extend the protection to new, unrelated charges.
However, the Bing decision has consciously realigned state
treatment of the right to counsel in new, unrelated charge
situations with the federal interpretation evidenced in Maine v.
Moulton. Although the court has kept the Rogers rule intact, 2 11 it
seemingly has limited that holding to the context of a single arrest. 2 12 That is, a waiver with respect to the unrelated
questioning is invalid in the absence of counsel in the context of a
single arrest if preceded by invocation of the right to counsel. 2 13
The Bing court has purposefully distinguished this from unrelated
questioning in the context of a separate, unrelated arrest. 2 14 Like
the federal court, New York courts will now allow waiver with
respect to a separate, unrelated charge despite previous
attachment of the right to counsel. 2 15
Therefore, in such a setting, under both the federal rule and the
state.rule, incriminating statements obtained with respect to the
prior pending charge cannot be used if obtained subsequent to a
waiver for the new, unrelated charge. 2 16 However, statements
209. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
210. See supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text.
211. See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 350, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022,

559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 485 (1990) ("[O]ur decision today should not be
understood as retreating from the stated holding of Rogers.")
212. See id. at 341-42, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.

213. See id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
214. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.

215. See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474
(1990).
216. Compare Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (defendant's
constitutional rights were violated when the court allowed incriminating
statements about theft charge for which the defendant had previously been
indicted obtained by electronic surveillance conducted for the purpose of
obtaining statements about a homicide) with People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d
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made with respect to the unrelated charge will be admissible in
such a scenario.
CONCLUSION

As shown, recent Supreme Court decisions have effectively
weakened the sixth amendment guarantee of counsel applicable
during adversarial proceedings. 2 17 The attachment of such a right
during post-indictment proceedings is dependant upon affirmative
request for counsel by the defendant. 2 18 Additionally, the Court
will not impute a pre-indictment invocation of the right to counsel
to post-indictment questioning about unrelated matters if there has
been a voluntary waiver of counsel with respect to those matters. 2 19
Conversely, New York courts have consistently strengthened
the right to counsel applicable during later stages of criminal
prosecution by applying and interpreting its own state constitution. 2 20 In New York, an affirmative request for counsel is not a
prerequisite to the attachment of the right to counsel during
adversarial proceedings. Instead, the state judiciary has
determined that the right to counsel indelibly attaches at the
commencement of formal proceedings with or without a specific
request. 2

21

167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979) (where court found any
statements obtained after a request for counsel in the context of a separate
investigation in a single arrest would be suppressed) and People v.
Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981)
(where court found any statements obtained after the attachment of the right to
counsel on a prior, pending charge will be suppressed), overruled by, People

v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990) (which
left the Rogers rule intact but refused to extend protection of the right to

counsel to incriminating statements about new, unrelated charges in the context
of a separate arrest).

217. See supranotes 6-7, 48-58 and accompanying text.
218. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988); see also notes 6, 37,
51-54 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
220. See JudicialActivism, supra note 1, at 764.
221. See People v. Rowell, 59 N.Y.2d 727, 730, 450 N.E.2d 232, 233,
463 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (1983).
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In addition, instead of case-by-case judicial interpretation of the
elements of a knowing and intelligent waiver, New York courts
have adopted a per se rule which emphasizes the role of counsel. 2 2 2 Under the state constitution, a defendant cannot waive his
right to counsel after 1) an attorney has been requested, 2 23 2) an
attorney has entered the proceeding 2 24 or 3) judicial proceedings
have commenced. 225
However, the New York Court of Appeals has retreated from
expansive protection in the area of the right to counsel and its application to investigation of separate, unrelated charges. The
result has been a convergence with federal interpretation of sixth
amendment separate unrelated charge situations. It is clear that
both courts will suppress statements obtained in the context of a
separate unrelated charge investigation if those statements relate
to the prior pending charge. Similarly, it is clear that the
Supreme Court will allow statements obtained in the context of a
separate unrelated charge investigation if those statements relate
to the unrelated charge and defendant has voluntarily waived his
right to counsel. It is also likely, in light of People v. Bing, that
in such a situation the New York Court of Appeals will also
allow statements with respect to the unrelated charge if there has
been a voluntary waiver of counsel. 226

In sum, both the federal and state courts use similar guidelines
to determine the attachment of the express right to counsel. 227
However, the invocation and permanence of such attachment is
better protected under the auspices of the state constitution in the
area of single charge situations. In contrast, New York's retreat

222. See, e.g., People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
223. See People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 400 N.E.2d 360, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421 (1980) (expanded "once-an-attorney"
rule to include

defendant's specific request for counsel).
224. See supra note 96.

225. See supra note 98.
226. See supra notes 205-14.
227. See supra note 5.
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in the area of separate unrelated charge investigations has left the
New York defendant with no protection beyond that which is
provided by the Federal Constitution.
Joseph D. Sullivan
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